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its  troubling  labour  market  disincentives  for  second  earners.  Yet  attempting  to  prevent  this 




is possible  to enhance women’s access  to markets while also valuing and compensating  their 
unpaid  contributions.  The  paper  argues  that  a  way  through  this  dilemma  is  to  differentiate 



























In  this  chapter  I  examine  the  problem  of  income  splitting  under  an  individual  tax  unit  and 
Canadian legal developments that have expanded the scope for such tax planning by spouses. 
Income  splitting  poses  a  dilemma  for  tax  policy  analysts  concerned  with  gender  equality 
because,  left  unchecked,  it  opens  a  back  door  to  joint  taxation, with  its  troubling  impact  on 
labour‐market  incentives  for  secondary  earners,  who  are mainly  women.  Yet  ignoring  intra‐









of  economic  power  but  merely  reduce  tax  for  the  transferor.  The  key  problem  with  recent 
Canadian  changes  is  that  they  confer  the  tax  benefits  of  income  splitting  without  any 
requirement that the transferor share the underlying income or assets with the lower‐income 
partner. While this form of tax planning should be aggressively constrained, a gender‐equality 
case  can  be  made  for  more  liberal  treatment  of  genuine  intra‐household  transfers.  (For  an 




bad  forms  of  income  splitting.  In  particular,  feminist  tax  scholars  may  be  concerned  that 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concern,  I  argue  that  reducing  labour‐market  barriers  should  be  one  objective  but  not  the 
exclusive  focus  of  tax  reform  from  a  gender‐equality  perspective.  Drawing  on  feminist 
scholarship outside the tax field, I suggest that fiscal policy should also be crafted with a view to 
enhancing the autonomy of those who invest their energies in providing unpaid care. Designing 
rules about  income splitting  that encourage genuine  redistribution of  control over household 
resources  would  contribute  modestly  toward  meeting  this  goal,  at  least  for  women  with 









the  individual  or  corporate  ‘person’  (Income  Tax  Act:  s  2).      The  individual  unit  has  been 
extensively eroded over  time by  family‐related concessions and by  the use of a  joint unit  for 
purposes of tax‐delivered benefits (Lahey 2005: 74–76; Law Commission of Canada 2001: 72–
89).  However,  it  has  survived  as  a  basic  structural  feature  of  Canadian  income  tax  despite 
repeated challenges by supporters of  joint marital or familial taxation (Lahey 2000: 40–44).  In 
the 1960s, both the Royal Commission on Taxation (better known as the ‘Carter Commission’) 
and  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  Status  of  Women  recommended  a  switch  to  family  unit 
taxation  (Royal  Commission  on  the  Status  of Women  in  Canada  1970;  Royal  Commission  on 
Taxation 1966).  In  the 1990s,  social  conservative  advocacy  groups  and politicians  lobbied  for 
various forms of tax relief for single‐earner couples with children, including a wholesale shift to 
joint filing (Philipps 2002: 64–70). Among the stated reasons that policy makers have given for 
rejecting  such  proposals  and  for  maintaining  the  individual  tax  unit  is  the  unfairness  and 
negative  labour‐market  incentives of  joint  taxation  for women as  secondary earners  (Benson 
1969; House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance 1999). 
 
Academic opinion  in both Canada and the United States has  largely validated this  judgement. 
Many scholars have concluded that joint taxation tends to discourage women from entering the 
paid workforce or from spending more time on paid  labour because it raises the marginal tax 
rate  on  a  couple’s  lower‐earning  partner,  usually  a  woman  whose  employment  is  socially 
















joint  taxation.  All  countries  adopting  individual  taxation must  contend with  the  incentives  it 
creates  for  income  splitting,  which  creates  some  of  the  very  same  problems  more  often 




74.5).  These  so‐called  attribution  rules  have  never  been more  than  partial,  as  they  explicitly 
tolerate some forms of tax planning.1 Moreover, it has not been easy to enforce the spirit of the 




called dividend‐sprinkling arrangement, whereby a  spouse  received  special  non‐voting  shares 
on  incorporation  of  a  family  holding  company  (Duff  1999;  Neuman  v  Minister  of  National 
Revenue 1998). Although the husband controlled the corporation through his ownership of the 




marginal  rate  on  private  corporation  dividends  received  by  an  individual  who  is  under  18 
throughout  the  taxation  year  (Income Tax Act:  s  120.4). However,  because  it  applied only  to 
minors,  this  reform  still  permitted  spousal  dividend  sprinkling,  now  a  popular  method  of 
income  splitting  for  those  with  significant  income‐generating  assets  and  access  to  expert 
planning advice.. 
 
The  election  in  2006  of  a  Conservative minority  government  has  reignited  the  public  debate 
over income splitting, as there is significant support for income splitting among Conservatives. 
This support is reflected in the party’s official Policy Declaration, which states: 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We support the elimination of all tax disadvantages for families and those who 
care  for  children  at  home.  It  recognizes  the  economic  value  of  stay  at  home 
parents, and supports the introduction of tax fairness measures such as income 
splitting for couples with children. (Conservative Party of Canada 2008a: 7) 
This  resolution  has  not  yet  been  adopted  as  government  policy,  perhaps  because  doing  so 







how  tax  returns  are  filled  out.  Previously,  income  splitting  had  always  required  a  transfer  or 




The pension  income splitting  rules are as  close  to a  joint  return as has ever been possible  in 
Canada. Any employment or other income earned by the spouse will be stacked on top of the 
pension income reported on her return, creating the same type of market barrier as a joint unit. 








Tax  Free  Savings Account  (TFSA), which  also has  an  income‐splitting  component  (Income Tax 
Act: s 146.2). Taxpayers may make non‐deductible contributions of up to $5,000 per annum to 
a  TFSA, with  no  limit  on  total  contributions.  Investment  income  and  capital  gains  earned  on 
contributions  are  tax  exempt,  as  are  all withdrawals  from  the  account. Most  importantly  for 
present purposes, gifts  to a spouse or common‐law partner  that are used to  fund a TFSA are 





For  example,  a  coalition  of  activists  and  academics  (including  the  author)  working  with  the 








• Income  splitting  discourages  women’s  paid  workforce  participation  by 
increasing the tax rate on any income earned in the market. 









Alliance  for  International  Action  undated:  11;  see  also  Weir  2007; 
Woolley 2007).  
 
Notably,  these  points  overlap  substantially  with  the  criticisms  usually  levelled  against  joint 
filing.  Canadian  economist  Jonathan  Kesselman  has  made  similar  arguments  regarding  why 
either  joint  taxation  or  full  splitting  of  employment  income  would  be  unfair  to  two‐earner 
couples  and  would  reduce  women’s  labour  supply  in  ways  harmful  to  their  full  equality 
(Kesselman    2008:  25–34).  Similarly,  in  the  United  States,  Lawrence  Zelenak  has  argued  in 
favour of an individual unit but has opposed the idea of recognizing inter‐spousal assignments 
of  earned  income  under  such  a  system  because  it  would  recreate  the  labour‐market 
disincentive of joint taxation since, as he points out, ‘the wife’s income will still be stacked on 
top of the husband’s, and she will be discouraged from working’ (Zelenak 1994: 380). I argue in 
the  balance  of  this  chapter  that  concerns  about  discouraging  women’s  paid  work  through 
income splitting are valid but should be tempered by equally valid concerns about the need to 




as  a  reaction  to  the  specific  forms  of  income  splitting  being  promoted  by  the  Conservative 
government,  which  is  perceived  generally  as  hostile  to  equality  norms.    This  image  was 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II. WHAT INCOME SPLITTING RULES WOULD BEST PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY? 
A  gender  equality  case  can  be  made  for  allowing  some  types  of  income  splitting  between 
conjugal partners,  specifically where  there  is an actual  transfer of  legal and beneficial  title  to 
property or income. However, several concerns and caveats attend even this preferred form of 
income splitting. While the basic analysis presented here could apply to any country that taxes 
conjugal  partners  as  individuals,  I  concretize  the  arguments  by  describing  specific  reform 
proposals  for Canada. The discussion will  be organized around  three  claims  that are  typically 
made to support the argument for allowing more income splitting on gender equality grounds:  
(1)  that  such a  system would encourage more equal  sharing of economic  resources between 
men and women, (2) that it would respect women’s agency as property owners and (3) that it 
would  recognize  women’s  unpaid  contributions  to  household  welfare.  The  analysis  is 
predicated on the assertion that  gender equality is no less legitimate a measure for evaluating 
tax policy than are the more familiar criteria of vertical and horizontal equity among different 
groups  defined  by  income  level,  non‐discretionary  needs  or  choice  of  economic  activity  (cf 
Zelenak 1994: 380, 385). However, tax policy can address itself to gender equality only if rules 
are designed with  an  awareness of  intra‐household  impacts  and of  the  relative  treatment of 
paid  and  unpaid  economic  activities  undertaken  by  partners  in  a  marriage  or  common‐law 





Commentators  have  asserted  that  the  Canadian  attribution  rules, which  ignore  inter‐spousal 
gifts  and  even  some  fair  market  value  sales  for  income  tax  purposes,  have  ‘the  effect  of 
discouraging  husbands  from  transferring  family  property  to  their  wives  during marriage  and 
thus achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth’  (Brooks 1996: 74;  see also Kesselman 
2008: 24). Conversely, it has been suggested that ‘when tax liability follows legal ownership of 
incomes  and  property,  individual  taxation  of  people  in  relationships  promotes  economic 
sharing’  (Lahey  2005:  26;  see  also  Gann  1980:  50–51;  Zelenak  1994:  384–87).  Claire  Young 
recommended  that  empirical  research  be  undertaken  in  Canada  to  assess whether  repealing 
the attribution rules would actually result  in more asset transfers from men to women (2000: 
45, 48–49).  Since  then, a U.K.  study has  found evidence of  just  such an effect  (Stephens and 
Ward‐Batts 2004). The U.K. switched from joint to individual taxation in 1990 and allowed inter‐
spousal  transfers without  any  attribution of  income  from  the  transferred property.  Stephens 
and Ward‐Batts  examined  the  relative  shares  of  investment  income  reported  by  higher‐  and 
lower‐income spouses before and after the reform and found ‘strong evidence that households 
did  indeed  take  advantage  of  this  opportunity  for  tax  avoidance  through  income  shifting’, 















of  ownership  and  control’  (2007:  613).  These  comments  highlight  the  crucial  distinction 
between income splitting that is based on actual sharing of control over resources, versus that 
which is based on a reallocation of income for tax purposes only. While the first  is potentially 




increase  her  power  to  bargain  for  a  share  of  the  income  (2008:  22).    However  with  this 
approach  the  onus  rests  entirely  on  the  financially  dependent  spouse  to  wrest  control  over 
household  resources  through  a  process  of  private  bargaining  in which  power  differentials  of 
many kinds can still be expected to shape the outcome.  At best, one could imagine a savvy and 
relatively empowered spouse insisting on enough income to cover the additional tax liability as 
well  as  a  portion  of  the  higher  after‐tax  income  obtained  through  income  splitting.    By 
comparison,  making  income  splitting  conditional  on  a  transfer  of  underlying  assets  would 




If  Canadian  tax  policy  makers  sought  to  incentivize  intra‐household  transfers,  they  would 
therefore have  to  repeal both  the notional pension  income splitting  rules and  the attribution 









A  second  argument  in  favour  of  recognizing  genuine  inter‐spousal  transfers  is  the  need  to 
respect women’s agency as legal rights holders. Ignoring these transactions seems inconsistent 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the  transferee.  One  way  to  address  the  issue  of  informal  control  would  be  to  enact 
administrative  and anti‐avoidance  rules  that  established  criteria  for  ascertaining whether  the 
transferee was the true owner of the transferred property (Lahey 2000: 119; Philipps 2002). It 
would  be  important  to  require  spouses  to  submit  some  form  of  written  evidence  of  their 
contractual arrangements with their  tax returns  (Gann 1980: 63).  In addition,  there are many 
precedents within tax systems worldwide of rules that look beyond the form of a transaction to 
assess  its  economic  substance.  In  Canada,  for  example,  control  of  a  corporation  for  some 
purposes  is  defined  not  only  by  the  traditional  de  jure  test  of majority  ownership  of  voting 
shares but also by a de facto test that considers whether a person exercises control ‘directly or 
indirectly in any manner whatever’ over the corporation (Income Tax Act: s 256(5.1)). De facto 
control  can  include  a  situation  where  a  single  creditor  is  allowed  to  withdraw  all  of  the 
corporation’s  financing by demanding  repayment of  a  loan on  short notice  (Canada Revenue 
Agency  2001:  paras  19–23).  Another  rule  that  could  be  adapted  to  apply  to  inter‐spousal 
transfers  is  the  provision  that  denies  the  charitable  donation  credit  for  so‐called  ‘loanback’ 
arrangements, where a donor uses any property of a  charitable entity within  five years after 
making  a  donation  to  that  charity  (Income  Tax  Act:  s.118.1(16)).  This  provision  applies,  for 
instance,  if a private foundation lends money back to a donor, even if the  loan is at a market 
rate of  interest.  In addition, Canada already has a rule that prevents  income splitting through 
revocable trusts, which are defined very broadly  (Income Tax Act: s 75(2)).  If the trust property 
may revert to the settlor at any future time, or if the settlor has any right to determine or even 
consent  to  distributions  of  trust  property  to  others,  then  all  the  income  and  capital  gains 






anti‐avoidance  rule  that  employed  broad  standards  such  as  ‘reasonableness’  which  require 







interpretation,  rather  than  bright  line  tests.  Such  standards  constitute  an  essential  tool  for 
reducing  avoidance  precisely  because  they  inject  some  flexibility  to  deal  with  new  and 
unforeseen transactions, and create some uncertainty as to how far the rules may be stretched 
by tax planners (Edgar 2008: 874; Royal Commision on Taxation 1966: 552‐567). Anti‐avoidance 




legal  and  beneficial  title  should  be  treated  as  tax  effective  on  the  basis  that  transferees  are 
rational agents with the capacity to exercise their legal rights directly or through the process of 
bargaining with  a  spouse  over  consumption  decisions.  Empirical  evidence  supports  the  view 
that women tend to enjoy greater power over household financial decisions and feel less guilt 
about spending money when they have a stream of  income that  is  legally  their own  (Burton, 
Phipps  and Woolley  2007;  Kornhauser  1993:  80‐91).  The  studies  emphasize  that  couples  are 
extremely diverse in terms of the extent to which they share decision‐making power about how 





the  income  stream  and  the  underlying  asset,  further  increasing  her  chances  of  financial 
autonomy.   As  Zelenak argues,  ‘owners of wealth  can always determine how  to employ  that 




Even  in  cases  where  a  transfer  of  title  does  not  alter  substantive  power  relations  within  a 
relationship,  legal  ownership  may  become  more  important  on  relationship    breakdown. 
Canadian family law provides for property equalization upon divorce but formal rights are often 
difficult  for a non‐titled spouse to enforce  in practice  for a host of  reasons—including  lack of 
access to costly legal advice or to courts in order to establish or enforce a claim; the difficulty of 
tracing assets  that may be owned outside  the country; pressures  to  trade child custody  for a 
lesser  share  of  property;  the  exclusion  of  some  intangibles  like  professional  degrees  and 
licences  from  what  is  considered  divisible  property;  and  the  legal  uncertainty  surrounding 
others such as unvested pension plan rights (Bala 1989; Grassby 2004; Langer 1994; Poirier and 
Boudreau 1992; Law Commission of Ontario 2008). Moreover statutory property equalization 
regimes  do  not  apply  to  common‐law  partners  in  most  provinces,  making  title  even  more 
important  in  determining  the  post‐relationship  distribution  of  assets  for  these  couples  (Law 
Commission of Ontario 2008: 39; Mossman 2008).  Thus, encouraging intra‐household transfers 
promotes the long‐term financial security of a lesser‐earning spouse or partner, even where the 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An argument  frequently advanced to  justify  income splitting  is  that  it  recognizes  the value of 
women’s  unpaid  contributions.  In  considering  this  claim,  it  is  worth  distinguishing  between 
unpaid caregiving  for children or other dependents on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
unpaid work that is done informally within family businesses or to assist employees. Elsewhere 
I  have  described  this  latter  form of  activity  as  ‘unpaid market  labour’  because  it  contributes 
directly to the generation of market income (Philipps 2008a, 2008b). I argue below that while 
Canadian  tax  rules  should  make  it  easier  to  deduct  amounts  paid  to  compensate  a  family 
member  for  informal  assistance  in  a  business  or  job,  using  income  splitting  as  a  means  of 
compensating unpaid caregivers is more problematic from a gender‐equality perspective. 
 
With  respect  to unpaid market  labour, many  sociological  studies have documented  the  roles 
that  family members  play  in  the operation of  small  businesses  and professional  firms  and  in 
directly  assisting  with  employment  duties  of  their  spouses  or  other  relatives  (reviewed  in 
Philipps  2008a:  92–98).  Spouses  may  perform  tasks  that  are  easily  recognizable  as  a 
contribution to business operations or management or to the fulfillment of the other spouse’s 
employment  obligations.  A  spouse  may  also  serve  in  a  capacity  such  as  social  host  or 
community ambassador for an organization that is owned by or employs the other spouse.  One 
scholar has used  the  term  ‘two‐person career’  to describe middle‐class  jobs  in which spousal 
participation  is  expected  or  desired  in  order  to  generate  goodwill,  develop  commercial 
relationships  or  simply  provide  backup  for  the  paid  worker  (Papanek  1973).  Recent  studies 
suggest  that  the  flexibilization  of  labour markets  and working  practices  and  the  rise  of  self‐
employment and micro‐businesses have ensured ongoing and perhaps  rising demand  for  this 
unpaid market  labour within many  families  (see  eg.  Baines  et  al  2002;  Baines  and Wheelock 
1998;  Danes  and  Olsen  2003;  Eardley  and  Cordon  1996:  111;  Rowe  and  Hong  2000). While 








(Income Tax Act:  s 74(5); Philipps 2008a: 77). While  this  rule was  repealed  in  the  late 1970s, 
revenue  administrators  and  courts  remained  sceptical  in  some  cases  toward  claims  that 




involvement  in  a  business  (see,  for  example, Cullen  v.  Canda  1985; Kuchirka  (M.)  v.  Canada 
1991; Sedelnick  Estate  v. Minister  of National  Revenue 1986).  It  is  particularly  difficult  under 
Canadian  law  for an employee  to deduct wages or  fees paid  to a  spouse who assists  in  their 
work. Such costs may   be deducted only by an employee who  is  ‘required by  the contract of 
employment’ to hire and pay an assistant (Income Tax Act s 8(1)(i)(iii)). Thus, even where there 




that  this  condition will  ‘ordinarily’  require an express  term  in a written employment contract 
but that it may also be satisfied ‘where the taxpayer can establish that it was tacitly understood 
by  both  parties  (the  taxpayer  and  the  employer)  that  such  payment was  to  be made by  the 




The  courts  have  taken  different  views  of  this  question.  In  one  recent  case,  the  Tax  Court  of 
Canada held  that  a branch manager  for  investment  advisor Merrill  Lynch  could not deduct  a 
salary  paid  to his wife,  as  his written  contract  of  employment was  silent  on  the need  for  an 
assistant,  though  the  employer  had  signed  a  separate  form  confirming  that  an  assistant was 









Other  judges  have more  easily  accepted  that  spousal  assistance may  be  tacitly  necessary  in 
order for an employee to carry out his or her job successfully, despite the lack of any reference 
to  this  need  in  the  formal  contract  of  employment.  A  good  example  is  Schnurr  v  R.  (2004), 
where the Court allowed the taxpayer to deduct a $30,000 salary paid to his wife for secretarial 
and client  relations work,  including making contacts  in  the community  to generate clients  for 
her  investment  advisor  husband  (see  also  Longtin  v.  R.  2006).  Yet  even  the  most  liberal 
interpretation of the statutory rule does not permit the deduction of payments to a spouse who 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The unfairness of this regime is highlighted by the fact that business proprietors have a much 
broader  scope  for deducting wages or  fees paid  to  family members.  These expenses may be 
deducted  just  like any others  that are  incurred  ‘for  the purpose of earning  income’  from  the 
business,  subject  to  a  reasonableness  test  (Income  Tax  Act:  ss  9(1),  18(1)(a),  67).  The  courts 





A  similar  regime  should  be  adopted  for  employees  whose  spouses  help  them  carry  out  job 
duties (cf. Kesselman 2008: 28).    I suggest it  is not even appropriate to describe commercially 
reasonable compensation of a family assistant as ‘income splitting’, as this suggests a gratuitous 
payment  purely  driven  by  tax‐avoidance motives. While  there may  be  a  tax  incentive  for  an 
individual  to employ  their  spouse,  this alone does not negate  the  income‐earning purpose of 
the arrangement or the value of the services provided.   
 
A  possible  criticism  of  my  proposal  is  that  it  would  encourage  women  to  work  for  their 
husbands instead of seeking independent employment. However, a spouse’s involvement in the 
work  of  a  primary  breadwinner  should  not  be  regarded  stereotypically  as merely  a  form  of 
subjugation or  gender oppression.  For  some women at  some  times,  collaboration  in a  family 
enterprise may provide better opportunities and work‐life balance, and indeed more economic 
power,  than  the  regular  labour  market  (Philipps  2008a).  Neither,  however,  should  such 
arrangements be romanticized as somehow free of the conflicting interests and hierarchies of 
family  life.  Household  inequalities  are  reinforced  by  a  tax  regime  that  discourages  fair 
compensation  of  spouses  for  their  informal  market  work  by  denying  deductibility  for  tax 
purposes. Liberalizing the rules would not only encourage redistribution of control over market 
income  within  households  but  would  also  help  to  degender  market  work  symbolically  by 
acknowledging that it is frequently produced through the joint labour of spouses.  
 
Using  income  splitting  as  a  mechanism  to  recognize  the  value  of  unpaid  caregiving  is  more 
problematic.  For  instance,  some  commentators  have  suggested  allowing  taxpayers  to  deduct 
actual payments to a spouse who is providing unpaid care to dependents (Duff 2000: 73‐74) or 
simply  extending  the  notional  pension  income  splitting  rules  to  all  couples  (Mintz  2008:  17). 
While some such proposals openly promote a patriarchal model of the family with more sharply 
defined gender  roles  (eg, Szabo 1997), others present  it as a  route  to greater equality within 
relationships.  Undoubtedly,  the  failure  of  public  policy  to  value  the  work  of  caregivers  is 
significantly linked to women’s ongoing economic inequality. Yet I would argue that promoting 
more  income splitting of any kind  is a problematic strategy  for addressing  this  issue. When a 
spouse  directly  assists  an  employee  or  entrepreneur  to  produce  income,  these  are  market‐





be  the  main  way  of  recognizing  these  contributions  because  that  would  leave  primary 
caregivers  dependent  on  the  goodwill  of  individual  breadwinners.  Rather,  a  system  of 
refundable tax credits or other state transfers is needed to increase the autonomy of primary 
caregivers  by  providing  an  alternate  source  of  economic  security.  In  Canada,  such  a  system 
could be  financed by  repealing  the  spousal  credit  and other dependency  credits delivered  to 
primary  earners  and  discussed  by  Casey  Warman  and  Frances  Woolley  in  chapter  x  and 
replacing them with a refundable credit paid directly to caregivers (Law Commission of Canada 
2001:  73).  This  approach would  have  the  advantage  of  reaching  single  caregivers  and  those 









Strategies  to  demarginalize  caregiving  work  have  received  far  less  attention  within  tax 
scholarship.  While  improving  women’s  labour‐market  opportunities  is  obviously  a  crucial 
dimension  of  gender‐equality  struggles,  feminist  scholars  working  outside  the  tax  field  have 
increasingly argued that this needs to be tempered with efforts to value caregiver work and to 
assign it more equally to men and women. Joan Williams, for example, has discussed the failure 
of  a  ‘full  commodification’  strategy,  focused  singlemindedly  on  equalizing  employment 
opportunities, to achieve gender‐equality goals (Williams 2000: 40–48). Among other problems, 
she points out  that  this  strategy glosses over  the discrimination and poor working conditions 
that many women  face  in  the  labour market  and  the  relative  satisfaction  and  solidarity  they 
may  derive  from  their  family  work,  a  perspective  that  has  been  voiced  especially  by  many 
women of colour and working‐class women. Similarly, Nancy Fraser has argued that a ‘universal 
breadwinner’ model of gender equality that values labour market access above all else fails to 
address  the  problem  that  women  continue  to  do  the  bulk  of  unpaid  household  work,  even 
when they are employed full time (Fraser 1997: 41‐68). If feminist tax scholars do not directly 
address  the  need  to  value  unpaid  caregiving,  they  risk  ceding  this  ground  to  a  social 
conservative  movement  that  has  a  clearly  defined  politics  of  promoting  one‐earner 
families(Luxton and Vosko 1998: 52).  
 
Biases  in  taxation  and  other  biases  against  women’s  paid  labour  do  need  to  be  addressed. 
However, these barriers should be tackled more directly through tax reforms aimed at lowering 
the cost of entering paid work and reducing the fiscal burden on secondary earners. Providing 
better access  to  substitute care  services  is obviously a  central  requirement, whether  through 
tax  deductions  or  direct  programming.  Lahey  has  outlined  a  comprehensive  set  of 
recommendations for reducing the high marginal tax rates experienced by secondary earners in 










a  topic  that  is  perennially  troublesome  for  countries  that  treat  individuals  as  separate 
taxpayers. It has highlighted the confusion that arises when the term ‘income splitting’ is used 
to  describe  both  real  and  notional  transactions  between  conjugal  partners.  I  argue  that 
differentiating  these  phenomena  is  the  key  to  articulating  a  tax  policy  solution  that  coheres 
with  gender‐equality  goals.  That  solution,  I  propose,  is  to  recognize  real  income‐splitting 
transactions more readily for tax purposes while eliminating notional  income splitting rules  in 






markets  and  families.  In  the  Canadian  context,  however,  I  suggest  the  following  set  of 
complementary  reforms:  (1)  repealing  the  pension  income  splitting  rules;  (2)  repealing  the 
attribution rules, subject to anti‐avoidance provisions designed to catch transfers that have no 
economic  substance  and  subject  to  the  transferor  realizing  any  accrued  gains  at  the  time  of 
transfer; (3) replacing spousal dependency credits with a new refundable credit or transfer for 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